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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to carry out a study on the limits of the concept of 
Corporate Social Performance (CSP) and its instrumentation in the form of the Balanced 
Scorecard (BSC) and the Sustainability Balanced Scorecard (SBSC), faced with the paradoxes 
of sustainable development induced by the existence of different expectations and from 
various stakeholders. Our purpose is to exceed the neo-institutional decoupling thesis by 
proposing an approach based on the recognition and management of paradoxes. With this in 
mind, we explore the opportunities offered by the concept of interactive control (Simons, 
1995) and we propose an alternative to the Balanced Scorecard by substituting the concept of 
a "Paradoxical Scorecard." 
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Introduction 
 
The growing importance of preoccupations linked with sustainable development at the level 
of corporate management shows the interest of a fundamental reflection on Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) and its instrumentation in the form of models for measuring and 
controlling performance. For many experts or managers, it entails at present the integration in 
a single performance model, of economic, social and environmental dimensions generally 
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selected as the three components of sustainable development. This approach coincides with 
the changing patterns of normative instrumental models for the measurement of performance 
over the past three decades. This evolution has resulted notably in the emergence of 
multidimensional models, involving at one and the same time both financial and non-financial 
measurements and providing a "balanced and integrated" representation of performance 
measurements (Itnner and Larcker, 1998; Brignall and Modell, 2000). The Balanced 
Scorecard (BSC) is a prime example (Itnner and Lacker, 1998). It is based notably on the idea 
of a virtuous chain of causality through which innovation and learning foster operational 
excellence while enabling customer satisfaction and, ultimately, the creation of shareholder 
value. But as Brignall (2002) has noted, in its classic form, the BSC reduces its search for 
balance to three essential Stakeholders: employees, customers and shareholders. 
The taking into account of social and environmental considerations required then the 
extension of the model to a broader set of Stakeholders. It is in this perspective that the 
concept of the Sustainability Balanced Scorecard (SBSC) emerged which proposes to 
integrate sustainable development issues at the heart of the logic of the BSC. Despite the 
reservations of several authors (Bieker and Gminder, 2001; Dyllick and Hockerts, 2002), the 
SBSC’s thus constitute an attempt at the instrumentation of the CSP in that they allow the 
integration or balancing, within the same performance model, of the economic, social and 
environmental considerations. 
In contrast to this, a neo-institutional reading of the monitoring and reporting practices of CSP 
severely questions this hypothesis of an integration of the three dimensions of sustainable 
development and is more inclined to evoke the idea of decoupling. According to the neo-
institutional theories, practices and procedures, concepts and management techniques, 
"function as powerful myths and many organizations adopt them ceremonially." (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977, p. 340). But there may be a conflict between compliance with the 
institutionalized rules and the search for effectiveness imposed by the coordination and 
control of activities. To maintain the "ceremonial conformity" and thus ensure their 
legitimacy, organizations tend to operate a double decoupling: between formal structures 
oriented towards the search for legitimacy vis-à-vis the outside world and their activities on 
the one hand; and between their internal operations, in their turn decoupled, on the other. 
Such an approach breaks with the normative image of the integration and strategic alignment 
conveyed by the normative and instrumental approaches to management control (Capron and 
Quairel, 2006). The practices claiming to emanate from CSP appear therefore as 
institutionalized myths. They proceed more as ceremonial instruments aimed at ensuring the 
legitimacy of the organization in its institutional field, just like practices registered within the 
framework of an effective monitoring of performance or an effective accountability to 
Stakeholders. 
Thus, the concept of CSP and its instrumentation in the form of "integrated" or "balanced" 
performance models, would not stand up to the test of differentiated and contradictory 
expectations of an expanded set of Stakeholders. As Brignall and Modell have indicated 
(2000), the multiplicity of interests of Stakeholders requires that organizations conduct 
arbitration. However, to cope with the conflicts inherent in such arbitration, management must 
adopt a seemingly irrational and hypocritical strategy. 
Several approaches however require the transcendence of the neo-institutional assumption 
according to which the practices aimed at ensuring the external legitimacy would be purely 
symbolic and, in all cases, decoupled from internal operational systems (Abernethy and Chua, 
1996). The neo-institutional approach must then be enriched by leaning towards strategies 
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used by directors to meet the conflicting expectations of their various Stakeholders and face 
up to pressure from these people and their respective degrees of influence. (Oliver, 1991; 
Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; Weaver et al., 1999). If decoupling is a strategy aimed at 
circumventing the problem of contradictions and tensions inherent in sustainable development 
issues, another approach, on the contrary, is to accept the paradoxes of the global performance 
and make a monitoring object of it. This latter can then become oriented towards a 
contradictory and political dialog concerning multiple and conflicting issues of sustainable 
development. The concept of interactive control developed by Simons (1995) could, under 
these conditions, be particularly successful in establishing a form of political control in the 
sense of Hofstede (1978). The question then arises of the instrumentation of such a control. It 
would therefore be necessary to accept that on a single dashboard, targets and measurements 
coexisted, reflecting conflicting issues - these contradictions being aimed at stimulating 
interactive discussions. To this end, it would be useful to replace the concept of "balanced 
scorecard" by that, altogether more appropriate, of "paradoxical scorecard". 
The purpose of this article is to reflect upon the limitations of the "integrated" or "balanced" 
models for measurement of the CSP and their instrumentation in the form of Balanced 
Scorecards or Sustainability Balanced Scorecards, faced with the paradoxes of sustainable 
development which create differentiated and contradictory expectations of different 
Stakeholders. Our aim is to exceed the theory of neo-institutional decoupling by offering an 
approach based on the recognition and management of paradoxes. To this end, we explore the 
opportunities offered by the concept of interactive control (Simons, 1995) and offer an 
alternative to the Balanced Scorecard by substituting the concept of "Paradoxical Scorecard."  
Our approach is motivated by a triple theoretical, methodological and managerial interest: on 
a theoretical level, the article mobilizes the neo-institutional theories (DiMaggio and Powell 
1977; Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and will study the conditions for surpassing the decoupling 
thesis by taking into account the model of the control levers of Simons (1995) as well as 
strategies of actors and power relations between Stakeholders, starting from notably,  an 
approach based on the analysis of paradoxes (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989; Lewis, 2000, 
Smith and Lewis, 2011). On a methodological level, it means developing a conceptual 
analysis aimed at formulating research proposals in the context of future empirical research. 
Finally on a managerial level, it means exploring possible ways of instrumentation for an 
interactive control promoting monitoring in paradoxical contexts. 
After putting the concept of CSP to the test regarding contradictions arising from different 
expectations of Stakeholders and the thesis of neo-institutional decoupling (1), we explore the 
prospects for the interactive monitoring of paradoxes of sustainable development, based on a 
contradictory strategic dialogue around sustainable development issues from an 
instrumentation based on the concept of a "paradoxical scorecard" (2). 
1. The limits of an integrated or balanced representation of the CSP in the 
face of the paradoxes of sustainable development  
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Sustainable development is primarily a macro-economics concept. According to the Bruntland 
Report1, which provides a definition of reference, it is "a mode of development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs." This would generally result in compliance with a triple requirement of economic 
prosperity, social justice and respect for the environment. At the company level, the issue of 
sustainable development can be declined through the idea that the social responsibility of the 
company rests on its ability to meet the expectations of society in economic, social and 
environmental terms. The green paper of the Commission of the European Union defines 
Corporate Social Responsibility thus "as a concept whereby companies integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis"2. It is upon this ability of the company to integrate 
economic, social and environmental dimensions in its management that representations of the 
current concept of CSP now seem to be based. They tend towards a multidimensional 
performance model aimed at integrating the three dimensions of sustainable development and, 
thus, the expectations of a wider range of Stakeholders. But the taking into account of 
differentiated and conflicting interests of various Stakeholders in an integrated performance 
measurement raises many questions. Firstly, it is worth noting the conceptual and empirical 
limitations of the concept of CSP (1.1.). Then, it is important to consider the ideal of 
integrated or balanced performance, as represented by the BSC (1.2.). Finally, a neo-
institutional reading of Corporate Social Performance issues tends to weaken the model by 
suggesting more the hypothesis of a decoupling than that of integration (1.3.). 
1.1. The conceptual and empirical limitations of the CSP 
Interest in performance measurement, which cannot be reduced solely to economic and 
financial criteria, appears relatively early in the United States, and particularly, in 
contributions to the "Business and Society" approach which refers to the concept of 
"Corporate Social Performance" (CSP). The concept of CSP is then treated consubstantially 
with those of "Corporate Social Responsibility" (CSR1) or "Corporate Social 
Responsiveness" (CSR2) which appear as its "sister notions" (Wood, 2010). However, for 
many authors, a fundamental problem with the "Business and Society" field lies in the fact 
that there are no robust definitions of the concepts of CSP, CSR13 and CSR24 (Clarkson, 
1995; Wood, 1991). Carroll's model (1979) is one of the first attempts at the clarification of 
concepts. According to him, the three dimensions of CSP should be articulated and 
interconnected: the social responsibility that encompasses all the company's obligations to 
society and comprises four categories: economic, legal, ethical, discretionary or philosophical; 
the social issues which are related to these obligations: environment, product safety, 
discrimination and so on; response strategies adopted in the face of social pressures or 
Corporate Social Responsiveness: Denial, Defence, Acceptance, Pro-action. For Carroll 
                                                           
1
  Bruntland Report (2007): Our Common Future. United Nations World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED), April 1987. 
 
2
 Green Paper: Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility. Commission of the 
European Community. Brussels, 18/7/2001, COM(2001) 366 final. 
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(1979), the model incorporates economic performance in a model of social performance 
where the social responsibility, far from being separate from the economic performance is just 
part of the overall societal responsibility of the company (Carroll, 1979, p. 503). The work of 
Carroll (1979) has given rise to much development. Clarkson (1995), for example, suggests 
that the CSP can be analyzed and evaluated more effectively by using a model based on the 
management of relations with the Stakeholders. In the same vein, Wartick and Cochran 
(1985), Wood (1991), and then Wood and Jones (1995), developed a model based on that of 
Carroll (1979), basing their analysis on the management of Stakeholders. In effect, for Wood 
(1991), existing studies attempted to correlate variables that had no theoretical relationships. 
To make sense, these studies should therefore be integrated with the theory of Stakeholders 
who should be assigned three roles that would be the basis for the evaluation of the social 
performance: "multiple Stakeholders create expectations in terms of performance, live the 
effects of behaviour and evaluate the results of this behaviour"(Wood, 1991).  
 
The measurement of societal performance or CSP is therefore closely related to the 
consideration of the interests of a broader set of Stakeholders. Freeman (1984, p. 46) defines 
the notion of a Stakeholder as "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
attaining of the objectives of an organization." Returning to the typology of Donaldson and 
Preston (1995) and applying it to sustainable development, it is possible to distinguish three 
streams of research in the theory of Stakeholders:  
 
-  A "Business Ethics" stream which corresponds to the normative approach to the theory and 
seeks to take into account the demands and the intrinsic interest of a set of Stakeholders 
considered as legitimate; 
 
-  A descriptive stream of procedures or practices labeled "Responsiveness" (Ackerman and 
Bauer, 1976) which results from an analytical approach to the theory and seeks to identify the 
variables characteristic of Stakeholders that may influence managers (Mitchell et al., 1997) in 
order to understand how the latter respond to Stakeholders while acting in the interests of the 
company; 
 
- An instrumental stream that focuses on the organizational impacts of social responsibility on 
economic performance (Clarkson, 1995). 
 
These different streams show that the motivations of managers to take into account 
sustainable development in the management of the company may prove to be different. But 
they also underlie the fact that, according to the stream of privileged research, the content of 
the notion of performance can be different: for example, the normative stream refers to moral 
principles while the instrumental stream focuses on economic interests. However, the three 
streams of research meet the conditions of implementation of the social responsibility of the 
company. Firstly, even if they admit that the environment is characterized, as, for example, 
D'Aunno et al. (1991), state, by "independent groups and multiple organizations with 
conflicting demands at best uncoordinated," cooperation between the Stakeholders is sought 
by the three streams because it is considered essential to the proper functioning of the 
company. 
 
In addition, according to the three streams, the environment is perceived as threatening and 
the company is expected to look for discretionary margins so that each Stakeholder does not 
have the same importance in terms of dissent or collaboration. There will therefore be a 
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selection of Stakeholders for which there will be a solution. As a consequence, the 
responsibility is contingent according to the legitimacy of each demand and it is up to the 
manager to arbitrate and trigger the approaches of sustainable development whether they be 
strategic or at more operational levels. 
 
Many studies5 have then raised the question of the relationship between the social and 
economic components of performance. For Carroll (1979), the debate was initiated in 1962, 
when Friedman stated that the doctrine of social responsibility was fundamentally subversive 
because it naturally undermined the very foundations of our society by diverting the directors 
from the only social responsibility that was incumbent upon them in a free society: to 
maximize the wealth of their shareholders (Friedman, 1962). According to Friedman (1970) 
the search for financial performance is the only way for companies to become responsible vis-
à-vis society, considering that "the social responsibility of companies business is to make a 
profit."6 Beyond these considerations, Preston and O'Bannon (1997) conducted a synthesis of 
work addressing this relationship which resulted in a typology where the three categories of 
possible relationships between financial performance and social performance are identified: 
 
- financial performance determines social performance (by increasing or decreasing it); 
 
- social performance influences financial performance (positively or negatively); 
 
- social and financial performance interact and evolve together upwardly or downwardly.  
 
This typology reveals the difficult, if not impossible neutrality between the two forms of 
performance, although this relationship is difficult to explain, particularly because of the 
different contingency factors that affect it (Al-Tuwaijri et al, 2004). Thus, although other 
authors have addressed this relationship as possibly neutral (Gond, 2011) or more complex 
(Moore, 2001), it seems difficult or even impossible to determine clearly the interaction 
between social performance and financial performance. As noted by Mahon and Griffith 
(1997), "Twenty-Five Years of Incomparable Research" cannot provide an adequate highlight 
on the discussion.  
 
Recent considerations relative to sustainable development rest however on the implicit 
assumption of a harmonious development of financial, social and environmental performance. 
In the same spirit as the concept of the "Triple Bottom Line" or the "Triple P" model - 
"People, Planet, Profit" - developed by Elkington (1997), this new vision of CSP reflects an 
ideal of integrated or balanced performance. This then raises questions relative to the 
instrumentation of performance measurement and models of management control permitting 
the taking into account of CSP.  
 
                                                           
5
 For a review of the literature concerning the relations between economic performance and social performance, 
see notably: Mahon and Griffin, 1997; Carroll and Shabana, 2010; Wood, 2010; Aguinis and Glavas, 2012. 
 
6
 Such a conception is faithful to the neo-liberal doctrine for which, in a market economy, if each company 
carries out its mission of profit maximization, the laws of the market – an invisible hand – will permit wealth and 
social prosperity. It corresponds well to the North American vision of the SRE (Social Responsibility of 
Enterprises) in which it is more a matter of individual ethics where any attempt at regulation by the State is 
perceived as a threat to individual liberty and the source of pernicious effects.  
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The BSC, and notably its application to the problem of sustainable development in the form 
SBSC’s appears then as the instrumental ideal of an integrated or balanced model of 
performance. 
 
1.2. The BSC: an instrumental ideal of an integrated or balanced model of 
performance  
The idea of a Balanced Scorecard (BSC) seems consistent with that of integrated or balanced 
performance. Similarly, the concept of strategic alignment, represented through the "cause-
effects" model of the strategy map of the BSC suggests overall coherence. Considered thus, 
and, in particular, by virtue of the multidimensional nature of its measurements of 
performance, the BSC appears immediately as the preferred instrument for monitoring the 
CSP. It would fit perfectly in the normative perspective of a "management of Stakeholders," 
such as it appears in the "Social Issue Management" or "utilitarian and strategic" approaches 
which offer management tools that reflect expectations expressed by the various actors in the 
company (Capron and Quairel-Lanoizelée, 2004). Such a representation of the BSC, as a par 
excellence tool for the balanced management of Stakeholders is perfectly illustrated in the 
critique of Jensen (2001) concerning the theory of Stakeholders. In a highly virulent criticism, 
Jensen attacks the BSC in particular which he accuses notably of being a source of confusion 
and a diversion of the attention of managers from what should be the only score possible for a 
company: maximizing the value of the long-term market. For him, the BSC is "the 
managerial equivalent of the stakeholder theory" (Jensen, 2001, p. 17). The criticism is 
probably excessive to the extent that, by developing their strategy maps, Kaplan and Norton 
(1996, 2001) suggest precisely - in the case of private companies - causal chains that 
converge towards the reaching of financial targets of the company, conventionally measured 
by indicators of profitability. In this perspective, Kaplan and Norton (1996, 2001) effectively 
operate a hierarchy of BSC axes represented by the causal logic of the strategy map: for 
example, the skills and motivation of the personnel (learning-innovation perspective) allows 
for the control of operational excellence (internal process perspective), which leads to 
maximizing customer satisfaction (customer perspective) and, ultimately, to maximizing 
shareholder value (financial perspective). Thus, at least in its canonical form, the BSC would 
not really bring a balanced representation of the three dimensions of sustainable development 
(economic, social, environmental). Rather, it would tend to focus on the attainment of 
financial results. At most, would we be in the presence of a virtuous circle from which 
meeting the expectations of employees through their involvement and the development of 
their skills would allow them to excel in operational processes (quality, productivity, 
responsiveness and so on), which would then promote customer satisfaction and ultimately 
that of the shareholders. 
 
Faced with the growing importance of issues related to sustainable development in the 
management of companies, several researchers have proposed the development of the existing 
model of the BSC by including environmental and social issues (Bieker and Gminder, 2001; 
Figge, Hahn and Wagner, 2002; Epstein and Wisner, 2002; Zingales and Hockerts, 2003). It is 
thus that the concept of a "Sustainability Balanced Scorecard" (SBSC) appeared. Within the 
framework of a research program involving researchers from the Universities of St. Gallen 
and the INSEAD in cooperation with the University of Lueneburg, several experiments were 
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conducted in companies (Bieker and Gminder, 2001).  Zingales and Hockerts (2003), based 
on a review of empirical studies, also refer to concrete applications in the company. 
For many researchers the SBSC usually manifests itself either by adding a fifth axis called 
"Society" or "Non- market ", or by the introduction of social and environmental dimensions at 
the heart of the four existing axes. For Bieker and Gminder (2001), it is possible to consider 
five models of integration of sustainable development: 
 
- The partial approach: one or two indicators of sustainable development are integrated in 
some well-chosen dimensions from the BSC. 
 
- The additive approach: a fifth axis is added to the four main traditional axes of the BSC. 
- The total approach: the environmental and social dimensions are integrated into all 
dimensions of the BSC thereby allowing the promotion within the organization of a strong 
awareness of issues of sustainable development. 
 
- The transversal approach: strategies for sustainable development are integrated into the 
causality pattern of the strategy map as inducers of value permitting the fulfillment of the 
vision and strategic objectives. 
 
- The shared approach: the BSC is available at the level of a specific function such as the 
Management of Sustainable Development or the Human Resources function, for example. 
 
In fact, according to the company's strategy and the integration of matters related to 
sustainable development into this, several SBSC models can be implemented (Bieker and 
Gminder, 2001; Bieker, 2003). But above all, upon reading these works, it appears that more 
often than not, faithful to the classic representation of the BSC, the SBSC’s would not be the 
exception to the rule, in that they tend to focus on the performance of the financial axis. We 
would be in the presence of a model of the "business case" type (Dyllick and Hockerts, 2002; 
Carroll and Shabana, 2010). However, as several authors suggest, other models opting instead 
for the social dimensions  - "Social Case" - or environmental - "Green Case" - should also be 
considered (Bieker and Gminder, 2001; Dyllick and Hockerts, 2002). Whatever the case, 
whether it be the BSC or the SBSC, the term "balanced" raises questions, insofar as there still 
exists a hierarchy of performance criteria. This is what Brignall (2002) suggests. His article 
with the revealing title - "The Unbalanced Scorecard" - thus radically criticizes the 
"mainstream" of the multidimensional measurements of performance represented notably by 
the BSC (Brignall, 2002, p.1). Directly attacking the strategy map of the BSC, he considers 
that it only recognizes three key Stakeholders: employees, customers and shareholders. In 
fact, the model does not incorporate all the environmental and social dimensions. Brignall 
(2002, p. 4) then concentrates on the neo-institutional theories to emphasize the unbalanced 
character of powers and the differences of interest among these three key Stakeholders. In a 
previous article on the implementation of managerial tools in “New Public Management”, 
Brignall observes with Modell that such a situation leads managers ultimately to decouple the 
normative models of performance measurement, deemed to be balanced and integrated 
(Brignall and Modell, 2000). Such decoupling would not proceed from a passive response to 
institutional pressures, but rather, a rational choice to maintain a balance in the face of the 
imbalance of powers of the various Stakeholders. Brignall (2002) suggests also the 
broadening of the spectrum of Stakeholders beyond the traditional three parties involved in 
the BSC. But he notes, however, that the integration of all social and environmental variables 
introduces such complexity that it cannot be reduced to a causal linear universal 
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representation. For him, the strategy map should resemble a circular representation. Finally, in 
order to rebalance the BSC, Brignall (2002) recommends adding a fifth social and 
environmental axis, while recognizing that this will lead managers to "juggle" in order to 
meet the differentiated expectations of a vast number of Stakeholders. While noting the 
complexity of such a perspective, even its idealistic character, he concludes that this should in 
no way discourage future research, but on the contrary, stimulate it. 
 
Ultimately, the idea of an integrated model of performance raises many questions. Brignall 
and Modell (2000) note that recent research on performance measurement rests on an 
important normative argument according to which the measurements reflecting the interests of 
the various Stakeholders should balance each other and be integrated (Ittner and Larcker, 
1998). However, while studying public organizations, these authors observe that the 
multiplicity of interests of Stakeholders requires that the organizations conduct arbitrations. 
To cope with the conflicts inherent in such arbitrations, management should also adopt a 
seemingly irrational and hypocritical strategy (Brunsson, 1989). This comes under decoupling 
strategies highlighted in the neo-institutional approaches. 
 
 
1.3. The ideal of integration at the risk of neo-institutional decoupling 
On a theoretical level, the concept of Corporate Social Performance can be approached 
through the prism of the neo-institutional theory of legitimacy. DiMaggio and Powell (1977) 
observed that the organizations are part and parcel of highly structured organizational fields 
which form in total a recognized domain of institutional life (DiMaggio and Powell, 1977, p. 
148). Within the same organizational field, organizations that offer products and similar 
services, their main suppliers, customers, State and regulatory bodies and so on, interact. 
These organizational fields then provide a context in which the individual efforts of each 
organization to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraints, and thus maintain their 
legitimacy and chances of survival, often lead to homogeneity in the structures, culture and 
strategies. DiMaggio and Powell (1977) state that, when different organizations performing 
similar activities are structured within the same field, powerful forces are at work to make 
them similar. They thus describe a phenomenon of institutional isomorphism that can be 
divided into three mechanisms: coercive isomorphism resulting from formal and informal 
pressure exerted by other organizations upon which they depend, by the authorities or by the 
values of the society in which they operate; a mimetic isomorphism when the uncertainty or 
ambiguity of goals leads the organizations to imitate other organizations that make up the 
field in which they operate; a normative isomorphism, reflecting in particular the influence of 
social control within the same profession (Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995); cultural and 
socio-professional standards observable in a sector of activity. 
 
This isomorphism can be interpreted as a signal to the Stakeholders that enables organizations 
to become legitimate. For example, Suchman (1995) defines legitimacy as "a generalized 
perception or assumption by which the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or 
appropriate within a social system constructed of norms, values, beliefs and definitions". In 
addition, this legitimacy is not static, but results from a continuous process of legitimization, 
which underlies the fact that societal grievances can evolve, change, or even contradict 
themselves (Ashford and Gibbs, 1990). The fact that legitimacy is used effectively or 
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symbolically gives it the ability to act as an interface between the organization and its 
Stakeholders, since the latter, at one and the same time, can read the message through its 
position, and, in addition, the company can use its legitimacy to influence these Stakeholders. 
 
In so doing, Meyer and Rowan (1977) state that "organizations increase their legitimacy and 
their chances of survival regardless of the immediate effectiveness of practices and 
procedures thus acquired" (Meyer and Rowan, 1977 p. 340). Practices and procedures, 
concepts and techniques of management, "then function as powerful myths and many 
organizations adopt them ceremonially" (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 340). But as Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) point out, there may be a conflict between compliance with the 
institutionalized rules and the pursuit of efficiency imposed by the coordination and control of 
activities. 
 
Therefore, by institutionalizing itself, legitimacy is seen from the outside through the creation 
of ad hoc structures - a Sustainable Development Direction, for example - and the adoption of 
new rituals - social reporting, for example. However, if they are recognized and 
communicated externally, this operationalization presents the risk of not being efficient 
internally. This observation explains the notion of decoupling between the formal structure 
and the monitoring practices, as explained by Meyer and Rowan (1977): "to maintain 
ceremonial conformity, the organizations that reflect institutional rules tend to distance their 
formal structures of uncertainties linked to technical activities, by loosely coupling and 
introducing gaps between their formal structures and the activities of work itself." In effect, 
when the company is able to communicate concerning sustainable development and its 
appropriate attributes, its traditional rituals of monitoring and control (budgeting, 
management dashboards, quality control and so on) may not be in harmony with the symbols 
used. Moreover, the question is raised of the choice of criteria to evaluate the action of 
different rituals as far as sustainable development is concerned. The lack of clear criteria can 
then motivate the company to concentrate on new rituals focusing on an image of sustainable 
development consistent with prevailing values and more or less loosely coupled with more 
traditional structures and rituals responsible for ensuring the profitability and efficiency of its 
products. 
 
This framework permits the connection of the CSP and the devices of evaluation and 
monitoring  of sustainable development to the twin challenges of efficiency and legitimacy to 
which the company can respond with a more or less loose coupling (Oliver, 1991; Roome, 
1992; Hart, 1995). The neo-institutional theories present therefore the interest of showing that 
it is naive to believe in a fair contract between all the Stakeholders of strategies and control in 
terms of sustainable development because their interests are contradictory. Either the 
company chooses to have a loose coupling that can lead it to lean towards an extreme form of 
organizational hypocrisy in the sense of Brunsson (1989), that is to say towards a 
categorization of certain Stakeholders with whom it becomes important for the company to 
show that their concerns are recognized. This entails therefore, producing an appropriate 
discourse that can afford to give the illusion of rationality to the different Stakeholders and 
serve the search for legitimacy. Performance is then dissociated, which implies that the 
management control function ensures the control of economic performance, while other 
functionaries focus on the monitoring of social, societal and environmental performance. Or 
conversely, the company chooses to be pro-active in its SD strategy (Capron and Quairel-
Lanoizelée, 2004 and 2006), while SD is voluntarily integrated into the global strategy of the 
company which may result in a structural decoupling of the organization so that each function 
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can, with its information and control system, meet the requirements of different Stakeholders. 
These cannot have the same importance given the criteria of legitimacy, power and urgency 
which means that some Stakeholders may have responses to the detriment of other 
Stakeholders. 
 
In the final analysis, the taking into account of institutional pressures and the contradictory 
and conflicting expectations of the various Stakeholders highlights the paradoxes of 
sustainable development and strongly questions the ideal of integration and balance contained 
in the current representations of CSP, and especially in its instrumentation in the form of 
BSC’s or SBSC’s. On the normative representation of integrated models for performance 
measurement, neo-institutional approaches oppose a critical view based on the observation of 
decoupling. However, such an opposition turns out under analysis to be strongly reductionist - 
between, on the one hand, the idealized vision of an integrated and balanced management of 
Stakeholders, consisting of denying and concealing the existence of paradoxes and, on the 
other hand, strategies for avoiding paradoxes leading to decoupling - it seems that we have 
reached an impasse. It is therefore important to become oriented towards another 
representation of the measurement and control of the CSP, consisting of recognizing and 
accepting the existence of paradoxes.  It would seem to be an opportune moment to replace 
the Balanced Scorecard with the concept of the Paradoxical Scorecard. 
 
2. The « paradoxical scorecard » for an interactive control of paradoxes of 
sustainable development  
A paradox is defined as a set of contradictory but interrelated elements that exist 
simultaneously and persist over time (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989; Lewis, 2000; Smith and 
Lewis, 2011). The paradoxes consist of "underlying tensions", that is to say, elements that 
seem logical individually but inconsistent or even absurd when considered together. The 
sustainable development issues reveal precisely the tensions and contradictions that arise from 
the differentiated and conflicting nature of the expectations of different Stakeholders. The 
question that arises then is that of the integration of these paradoxes in the monitoring 
systems. However, the normative ideal of an integrated or balanced model of performance, 
such as is represented through the BSC or SBSC, rests on a denial of any paradox. Similarly, 
the neo-institutional stream describing decoupling practices would tend to suggest the idea of 
an avoidance of paradoxes. Confronted with institutional pressures and conflicting demands 
of different stakeholders, companies have no other outcome than a loose coupling between its 
management systems. Several studies now tend to question this assumption by notably 
suggesting alternatives to decoupling. Far from being denied or avoided the paradoxes could 
therefore be the object of an assumed management on the part of the directors (2.1.). It is in 
this perspective that we propose a monitoring model in which - far from being denied or 
concealed, in the form of a normative model which would only have the appearance of an 
integrated model, or avoided through decoupling strategies - the paradoxes would instead be 
highlighted and positioned at the heart of the monitoring system. This then emphasizes the 
relevance of a model of interactive control based on a strategic dialogue concerning the 
contradictory issues of sustainable development (2.2.). Such interactive control could then 
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rely on dashboards knowingly unbalanced that we suggest be qualified as "paradoxical 
scorecards" (2.3.). 
2.1. Beyond neo-institutional decoupling, towards an assumed management of 
paradoxes 
As Abernethy and Chua (1996) have noted, the neo-institutional assumption according to 
which practices aimed at ensuring external legitimacy would be purely symbolic, and in all 
cases, decoupled from internal operational systems, is now seriously questioned. Several 
authors (Oliver, 1991; Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; Weaver et al., 1999) are interested in the 
strategies used by managers to meet the contradictory expectations of their different 
Stakeholders and face up to their pressures and their respective degrees of influence. Oliver 
(1991), proposed a model in which the response behavior is grouped into five strategies: 
acquiesce, compromise, avoid, defy, manipulate (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Strategic responses to institutional processes 
(Oliver, 1991, p. 152) 
Strategies Tactics Examples 
Acquiesce 
Habit  Follow invisible, taken-for-granted norms 
Imitate Mimicking institutionnel models 
Comply Conform to the rules and norms in force 
Compromise 
Balance Balancing the expectations of multiple constituents 
Pacify Placating and accommodating institutional elements 
Bargain Negotiating with institutional stakeholders 
Avoidance 
Conceal Disguising nonconformity 
Buffer Loosening institutional attachments 
Escape Changing goals, activities, or domains 
Defiance 
Dismiss Ignoring explicit norms and values 
Challenge Contesting rules and requirements 
Attack Assaulting the sources of institutional pressure 
Manipulation 
Co-opt Importing influential constituents 
Influence Shaping values and criteria 
Control Dominating institutional constituents and processes 
 
For Abernethy and Chua (1996), the neo-institutional approaches would suffer from the same 
deterministic limitations that had been criticized concerning the theories of structural 
contingency and, in particular, insufficient consideration of relations between environmental 
and institutional determinism and the strategic intentions of dominant coalitions (Abernethy 
and Chua, 1996, p. 572). 
  
Thus, faced with institutional pressures, policy makers are not totally destitute and have 
choices. Among these possibilities, decoupling or "organizational hypocrisy" (Brunsson, 
1989), would be just one option among others. In addition, they form part of a strategic 
approach to maintaining the myth of balance between the conflicting interests of 
Stakeholders, while dissociating measurements at the level of different functional domains. 
We find here the requirements of Lawrence and Lorsh (1967) according to which, under 
conditions of uncertainty and complexity, organizational effectiveness depends on the ability 
to combine integration and differentiation. Faced with uncertainty and environmental 
complexity related to the variety and conflicting nature of sustainable development issues, 
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integration would be ensured by mobilizing the collective around the myth of a balanced and 
integrated management that Capron and Quairel (2006) summarize by the notion of global 
performance, while differentiation would occur through the dissociation of measuring systems 
and monitoring of performance. As indicated by Capron and Quairel (2006, p. 13), "The 
implementation and establishment of a system of global performance thus depends on the 
confrontation between the interests of Stakeholders and strategies of compliance, avoidance 
or manipulation of company directors (...) the integration of sub-systems could exacerbate 
conflicts between the actors and upset the balance that wishes to display the same importance 
for economic, social and environmental objectives. Dissociating measurements of 
performance maintains the myth of the possibility of complying simultaneously with various 
conflicting interests by ensuring a balance between them." For Capron and Quairel (2006), 
the dissociation thus becomes pro-active. While maintaining the myth of an integrated and 
balanced system of performance, these processes of dissociation are mobilized voluntarily by 
the directors and are sources of learning insofar as they produce shared representations in the 
organization. The integrated and balanced approach to performance would thus be considered 
as a "mobilizing utopia" (Capron and Quairel, 2006, p. 15). Despite the dissociation, Capron 
and Quairel (2006, p. 14) suggest notably, that "the existence of these systems of measurement 
for environmental and social performance widens the spectrum of possible options, creates a 
dynamic of learning for the directors (March, 1989) and develops the interactive control lever 
(Simons, 1995)". 
 
2.2. Interactive control, the expression of a strategic dialogue on the contradictory 
issues of sustainable development  
Having read the above, it is clear that, faced with the paradoxes of sustainable development, 
the directors may knowingly adopt a range of possible answers. Among these responses, does 
decoupling in the form of a pro-active dissociation, not proceed, ultimately, to a recognition 
of the existence of paradoxes and a willingness to manage contradictions inherent in the 
concept of sustainable development? We are far from an integrated and balanced model. But 
could we not accept an alternative to decoupling? This would be to accept the paradoxes and 
to base management on an ongoing and contradictory debate at two levels: 
 
- at the boundaries of the organization, with representatives of different Stakeholders, 
integrating their respective powers of negotiation and the differentiation of their expectations; 
- within the organization between the various functional and operational domains of the 
company. 
 
As shown by Hofstede (1978, 1981), in a situation of high ambiguity of objectives, and 
notably when this is linked to conflicts of interests and orientations between the Stakeholders 
and ruling coalitions, cybernetic controls are no longer appropriate and should be replaced by 
non-cybernetic controls. He evokes the idea of political control. However, such a control can 
only be based on the acceptance of contradictions and power relations around and within the 
organization. Dialogue and debate - even if they are contradictory - are then key elements in 
the process of control. The concept of the interactive control lever developed by Simons 
(1995) can then be extremely fruitful in this perspective.  
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Simons (1995) defines management control systems as "processes and procedures based on 
information, used by managers to maintain or change the configurations of the activities of 
the organization" (Simons, 1995, p. 5). He distinguishes four control levers which, far from 
being mutually exclusive, should be used in a complementary manner and should be part of a 
system within a global device for management control:  
 
The first two control levers are not directly involved in strategic processes - their function is 
to supervise the strategic domain - either to provide a framework for the search for 
opportunities and learning (belief systems) - or to focus the attention of managers on limits not 
to be surpassed at the risk of jeopardizing the survival or the core values of the company7 
(boundary systems). 
 
- Belief systems reflect an explicit set of organizational values that the directors communicate 
formally and reinforce systematically, to develop a culture and organizational goals likely to 
create meaning and to provide a common direction. These systems represent a lever of 
control, in that they are of a formal nature and are a product of explicit management - for 
example, systems of "credo", of charters or missions statements. 
 
- The Boundary systems refer to the demarcation of boundaries of strategic activities and 
focus the attention of directors on the risks to avoid. They aim to deter managers from all 
strategic temptations that could distract their attention and behavior from the mission and 
strategic goals of the organization. Simons (1995, p. 41). 
The two other control levers operate directly in the strategic processes, either in order to focus 
the attention of managers on the control of key success factors and to avoid any deviation of a 
prejudicial nature for the organization (diagnostic control systems), or in order to promote 
research opportunities, the emergence of new strategies and  organizational learning 
(interactive control systems). 
 
- Diagnostic control systems are focused on the control of critical variables of performance 
and represent the most classic form of management control (Simons, 1995). Such as defined 
by Simons (1995), they are "formal information systems that managers use to control 
organizational outcomes and correct deviations concerning preset standards of performance" 
(Simons, 1995, p. 59). They feature three characteristics: 1) the ability to measure the results 
of a process; 2) the existence of predefined standards to which results can be compared, and 
3) the ability to correct deviations from standards. We find here the characteristics of 
cybernetic control and its three conditions for validity (Hofstede, 1978). 
 
- Interactive control systems are focused on strategic uncertainties and oriented towards the 
search for opportunities and the emergence of new strategies. Simons (1995) defines them as 
"formal information systems used by managers to become involved regularly and personally 
in the decision-making activities of subordinates" (Simons, 1995, p. 95). These systems 
permit the "focusing of attention and promotion of dialogue throughout the organization (...) 
they provide frameworks and programs to discuss and motivate the gathering of information 
outside of routine channels" (Simons, 1995, p. 96). It is therefore the affair of top 
management, which should stimulate an interactive dialogue within the company: "Through 
                                                           
7
 Simons (1995, p. 41) uses the image of the Ten Commandments. 
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dialogue, discussion and learning which surround the interactive process, new strategies 
emerge" (Simons, 1995, p. 102). 
 
Beyond belief and boundary systems, it is particularly on the opposition between diagnostic 
control and interactive control that the opposition plays, for the moment nodal, between two 
paradigms of control: the model of cybernetic regulation and that of organizational learning 
(Hofstede, 1978). In concrete terms, diagnostic control systems rely on common devices of 
management control (plans, budgets, management dashboards, reporting systems and so on). 
In contrast, the interactive control systems can use tools of these common devices, but in the 
form of participative management, fostering interaction, the sharing of information and 
learning, through processes of collaborative and transversal exchanges. This involves, for 
example, committees, work meetings, groups for progress or performance reviews. 
The study conducted in a company's energy sector by Essid and Berland (2011) focuses 
specifically on the impact of Sustainable Development on the control levers of Simons 
(1995). However, this research sheds light on the limitations of such an interactive control. 
The results reveal that the implementation of an interactive control of sustainable 
development results in cognitive overload for the managers concerned. This then leads to the 
shift of interactive control to a mode of diagnostic control. Moreover, the complexity linked 
to the wide variety of indicators and the cognitive overload it creates, lead to a temporal and 
spatial decoupling of the control systems. Interactive control is then confined to given 
hierarchical levels. Finally, in the mentioned case, managers have tended to pull back from 
the interactive analysis of indicators common to several hierarchical levels based on reporting 
data, limiting themselves to about a dozen indicators. These observations tend to highlight the 
difficulties of an interactive monitoring of sustainable development. In his work, Simons 
(1995) has already evoked the time-consuming nature of interactive control. This is one of the 
reasons why he recommends that on n control systems, only one be dedicated to interactive 
control, the n-1 others corresponding to diagnostic control. Such difficulties are also identified 
by Tuomela (2005). The increased variety of indicators, related to the simultaneous 
consideration of environmental variables, social and economic, would be likely to complicate 
the control system and cause a cognitive overload. The paradoxical character of objectives 
and indicators of sustainable development would then reinforce this overload. The decoupling 
could then be a first response to this problem. Several empirical studies on the influence of 
problems of sustainable development on the practices of management control would tend to 
confirm this. Moquet (2008), for example, shows from the cases of the French Lafarge and 
Danone companies, how the contradictions between the logic of financial control systems and 
those of environmental and social control, lead to the separation of the two systems. Similarly, 
Fajfrowski (2011), from the case study of the "Areva Way" system at the Areva French 
energy company, complemented by questionnaires involving management controllers, 
concludes that the controllers participate only in a very small way in the environmental and 
social control system. Faced with contradictory institutional pressures, influential 
Stakeholders (shareholders, employees, NGO’s, media and so on), their function would tend 
to re-focus on their "core business", namely the monitoring and reporting of economic and 
financial performance. 
 
But, faced with the contradictions inherent in sustainable development issues, an alternative to 
decoupling could be considered. This would be to recognize the existence of paradoxes linked 
notably to the contradictory expectations of different Stakeholders and not seek to bypass or 
hide behind normative systems of control and reporting by claiming an integrated or balanced 
approach. In effect, the integration or the balance of control systems thus displaying a 
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multidimensional measurement of performance, would proceed more as ceremonial rather 
than being really efficient. Thus decoupled, these systems of monitoring and reporting would 
work more in parallel than in a truly integrated fashion. Rather than separate measurement, 
management and reporting systems in this way, it would then, inversely, foster a political 
dialogue including the differentiation of expectations and power relations of different 
Stakeholders. Interactive control within the meaning of Simons (1995) would be coupled with 
a political dimension in the sense of Hofstede (1978, 1981): 
 
- on a strategic level and at the boundaries of the organization, the directors could be involved 
in the discussions and debates bringing together the different functional directors who, 
through their domain of competence are responsible for interfacing with a privileged 
stakeholder. Representatives of Stakeholders could also take part in exchanges: 
 
- internally, and on a more operational level, the directors could also become involved in a 
dialogue and exchanges bringing together collaborators from all functional and operational 
directions. 
 
Contradictions and different viewpoints, far from being denied or watered down, would then 
be clearly stated and, after discussions between the actors concerned, strategies could be 
defined.  
 
For Simons (1995), interactive control aims at promoting organizational learning. It therefore 
seems reasonable to believe, that this learning can be enhanced when it is the result of the 
confrontation of ideas during a contradictory dialogue between actors from different social 
worlds. Capron and Quairel (2006) note that despite the dissociation, directors can implement 
interactive control levers of environmental and social performance at the level of operational 
managers and thus create a dynamic of organizational learning. Similarly, they note that the 
measurement of environmental and social performance widens the possible options for 
decisions and creates a dynamic of learning (Capron and Quairel, 2006, p. 11). For several 
authors, including Smith and Lewis (2011), the ability to accept and manage paradoxes 
promotes learning and helps ensure the perennity of the company. These authors consider that 
there is a relation between the dynamic capabilities of the company and the ability to respond 
to the paradoxical tensions. In the same vein, Smith and Tushman (2005), note that the ability 
to simultaneously face up to conflicting demands is a factor of performance in the 
organization. 
  
Following this discussion, we can put forward two proposals for research: 
 
Proposal No. 1: the implementation of an interactive control promotes dialogue and 
contradictory debates around conflicting issues of sustainable development. 
 
Proposal No. 2: the dialogue and contradictory debates around conflicting issues of 
sustainable development promote a dynamic of organizational learning. 
 
But such an interactive control cannot operate without a monitoring system displaying 
precisely the objectives and contradictory measurements. The system would not ultimately be 
as balanced as to not let the ideal representations of Balanced Scorecards be heard along with 
their socially responsible declination: Sustainability Balanced Scorecards. The interactive 
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monitoring instrument - also political - of sustainable development strategies, is more akin to 
that which could be qualified as a "Paradoxical Scorecard." 
 
 
2.3. Towards a « Paradoxical Scorecard », an instrument of interactive monitoring of 
strategies of sustainable development  
Ultimately, it seems possible to question this desire to want at all costs "to balance" a 
scorecard. Is not such an attempt inherently doomed to failure? Should there not be more 
interest in using scorecards or dashboards, intentionally unbalanced, regarding what they 
display concerning objectives and conflicting indicators, but where the interactive potential 
lies precisely in the debates and exchanges that such contradictions can create or even 
stimulate? We would then be in the presence of an interactive monitoring in which it would 
entail using dashboards politically (Hofstede, 1978, 1981), or strategically in the sense of 
Crozier and Friedberg (1977). The paradoxes introduced by the taking into account of 
sustainable development, far from being hidden, would instead be deliberately highlighted by 
the system. It would be up to the actors to make the necessary decisions following a 
deliberation mobilizing dialogue and debate. From this inter-subjective confrontation between 
actors with decision-making backgrounds, and with the patterns of representation and 
differentiated interests, learning might surface. 
 
Under these conditions, the concept of the Paradoxical Scorecard would seem to be more 
appropriate here than the Balanced Scorecard or the Sustainability Balanced Scorecard. It is 
therefore necessary to consider, as did Brignall (2002), the relevance of the strategy map of 
the BSC and its internal consistency. Should a strategy 
 map be maintained, even if it is the result of a process of interactive dialogue during the 
collective construction of the model and also reflects the arbitration enacted following a 
contradictory debate? Should it be deleted and retain only a set of scores from the BSC, 
divided into four or five axes? The analysis of diverse measurements separated from 
conflicting issues, in the context of interactive monitoring would then allow participants from 
different backgrounds to measure the contradictions inherent in sustainable development and 
in the multiple expectations of Stakeholders, to conduct arbitration and to define a strategy. 
The Paradoxical Scorecards, brought thus into use, could then represent the instruments for a 
management of paradoxes.  
 
Poole and Van de Ven (1989) thus suggest four possible attitudes to paradoxes: 
 
- acceptance where the contradictions are considered as such and their opposites taken into 
account; 
 
- spatial separation wherein the different dimensions are processed at different levels; 
 
- temporal separation where contradictory dimensions are arrested separately in time; 
 
- synthesis, in which all opposition is eliminated. Conflicting dimensions would then be 
hidden, or melted into an encompassing concept. 
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Note that the separation - spatial or temporal - refers us to the decoupling strategies - 
synthesis reflects well the idea contained in the representation of a "balanced or integrated" 
performance, being part of the "normative models of multidimensional measurement of 
performance" (Brignall and Modell, 2000) to which belong to the BSC or SBSC’s. Finally, 
the use of Paradoxical Scorecards such as those we presented in the context of interactive and 
political monitoring, is part of the logic of acceptance of paradoxes. 
 
The dashboards or scorecards thus mobilized could play the role of boundary objects (Star 
and Griesemer, 1989). Defined as such, "the boundary objects are objects that are sufficiently 
plastic to adapt themselves to the needs and local constraints of the different actors who use 
them, while being robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites (...) these objects 
may be abstract or concrete. They have a different meaning in different social worlds but 
their structure is sufficiently common to more than one world so as to make them 
recognizable and constitute a means of translation" (Star and Griesemer, 1989, p. 393). These 
objects provide notably an interpretative flexibility (Star, 2010) allowing margins of 
differentiated interpretation to different groups of actors. In particular, as Star (2010, p. 19) 
states, boundary objects are an arrangement that allows different groups to work together 
without prior consensus. Hansen and Mouritsen (2005) conducted research based on four case 
studies in which the BSC was considered as a boundary object. They came to the conclusion 
that the BSC might indeed represent a boundary object, in that it was sufficiently flexible and 
adaptable to meet individual contexts and organizational issues specific to each case, while 
maintaining its identity through the different contexts of use. These authors in particular show 
that the BSC does not exist as a predefined and normative model, but rather reflects the 
specific nature of the organizational problems of each case study, which explains the 
idiosyncratic character of its usage and the representations constructed by actors in its place. 
Naro and Travaillé (2011), again referring to the image of Mintzberg (1989) on the Jigsaw 
Puzzle and Lego, question the value of such a constructivist approach to the BSC (just like 
building a Lego), as opposed to a normative approach (as in the assembly - necessarily 
predefined – of a Jigsaw Puzzle). A fortiori, Paradoxical Scorecards, by offering a wider range 
of indicators to the diverse and conflicting issues, provide greater plasticity permitting an 
interpretative flexibility for different actors involved in the interactive monitoring without a 
consensus of departure being a necessary condition. 
 
This leads us to formulate two complementary research proposals:  
 
Proposal No. 3: the existence, in a single dashboard, of targets and measurements oriented 
towards contradictory goals, stimulates an interactive dialogue around issues of sustainable 
development. 
 
Proposal No. 4: these dashboards or "Paradoxical Scorecards", because they promote 
interpretative flexibility, function as boundary objects. 
 
Conclusion 
The current concerns related to sustainable development have created institutional pressures 
driving companies to integrate the logics of social and environmental responsibility into their 
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management. In terms of control management, monitoring and reporting, this has led to the 
search for integrated or balanced models of performance. At the same time, multidimensional 
models for measuring performance have been developed (Ittner and Lacker, 1998), of which 
the BSC is emblematic. The concept of CSP was well reflected in the development of these 
models offering, through their multidimensional nature, the ideal image of a balanced and 
integrated representation. Based on the logic of the BSC, the SBSC’s fit well into this context, 
insofar as they aim to integrate the three dimensions of sustainable development in a single 
performance model. 
 
However, the diversity of Stakeholders and their often conflicting expectations submit this 
managerial ideal of an integrated and balanced performance to numerous questionings at one 
and the same time theoretical and managerial. On a theoretical level, the neo-institutional 
theories indeed tend in effect to suggest that, far from observing an integration of 
measurement and reporting systems, there is instead a decoupling. On a managerial level, 
empirical studies on management practices of corporate social responsibility tend to confirm 
this leaning towards decoupling. It might even stem from a voluntary strategy of directors – 
pro-active dissociation - to preserve the myth of an integrated and balanced performance 
while maintaining the legitimacy of the company, and, at the same time, developing 
differentiated operational systems in order to effectively manage, in an isolated fashion, the 
various conflicting issues of sustainable development (Capron and Quairel-Lanoizelée, 2006). 
Integrated and balanced management performance then appears as a "mobilizing utopia" 
(Capron and Quairel-Lanoizelée, 2006), insofar as the organizational hypocrisy (Brunsson, 
1989) is a source of learning and is eventually transformed into action. This is consistent with 
the considerations of March (1976), who in his "technologies of foolishness," believes that 
hypocrisy is transient and a source of learning. 
 
But, beyond the neo-institutional decoupling and pro-active dissociation, several studies 
attempt to exceed the framework of neo-institutional theories, accusing them of their 
deterministic character, and giving further attention to power relations between Stakeholders 
and especially to leadership strategies (Oliver, 1991; Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; Abernethy and 
Chua, 1996; Weaver et al., 1999). Faced with institutional pressures, the directors might thus 
adopt differentiated behavior in their management of different Stakeholders and their 
respective relations of influence. The decoupling would be only one strategy among others. 
Research on the management of paradoxes (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989; Lewis 2000; Smith 
and Lewis, 2011) has highlighted the fact that if, dealing with paradoxes, it might be possible 
to observe a temporal or spatial separation (decoupling), and also be possible to envisage an 
approach aimed at resolving any conflict within an encompassing model. The authors suggest 
therefore, the idea of the synthesis of the BSC and likewise the SBSC by offering an 
illustration. However, a third approach is to accept the paradoxes. This latter approach seems 
particularly fruitful to us for research on reporting and the monitoring of sustainable 
development and in this research paper we have suggested the idea of overcoming the 
normative image of BSC’s and SBSC’s to suggest the concept of the Paradoxical Scorecard. 
This would then be an intentionally unbalanced scorecard, because it would reveal the 
contradictions inherent in conflicting issues of three dimensions of sustainable development 
and different expectations of Stakeholders. Used as part of an interactive control in the sense 
of Simons (1995), coupled with a strategic dimension (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977), such a 
monitoring approach corresponds to the recommendations of Hofstede (1978, 1981) who 
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observed that in situations of high ambiguity of goals, linked to the conflicting character of 
interests present, it would be convenient to adopt non-cybernetic control modes and, in 
particular, a form of control he qualifies as political. 
The Paradoxical Scorecard concept could, we believe, be particularly relevant to the practice 
of management control in situations where a consensus of the presence of different actors and 
Stakeholders might not exist. Beyond the issue of management control faced with the 
paradoxes of sustainable development, a common ground of application might be found in 
contexts of complex organizations where the convergence of goals is a variable problem: 
political and professional organizations (public organizations, health organizations, etc.). 
might be able to provide appropriate fields of study concerning this issue. 
 
In this article we have made several proposals concerning the issues and implications of such 
an approach. We have particularly stressed the important role of interactive control levers 
(Simons, 1995). We have advanced the idea according to which such an approach based on 
the managing of paradoxes might lead to organizational learning. The Paradoxical Scorecards 
through their interpretive flexibility, could then play the role of boundary objects and promote 
cooperation between actors from different social worlds, in situations where there is no prior 
consensus (Star and Griesemer, 1989). It now remains to think out the instrumentation and 
use of Paradoxical Scorecards and to submit the proposals that we have suggested to 
empirical studies. We believe that qualitative studies, based or action research, within the 
framework of case studies, might allow for observation and analysis of the processes involved 
in conflicting debates that could elicit Paradoxical Scorecards. The study of the process of 
learning and sense making that might then come into play would then require longitudinal 
approaches. 
The issue of management control, the design and implementation of systems for measurement 
and monitoring of performance, faced with the paradoxes of sustainable development remains 
to this day a subject of study particularly rich in interest and approaches based on the 
management of paradoxes offering potentially fruitful research opportunities that remain to be 
explored. 
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